Leonidas Polk (April 10, 1806 – June 14, 1864) was a Confederate general, a bishop of the Episcopal Diocese of Louisiana and founder of the Protestant Episcopal Church in the Confederate States of America, which separated from the Episcopal Church of the United States. He was a plantation in Maury County, Tennessee, and a second cousin of President James K. Polk. He resigned his ecclesiastical position to become a Major general in the Confederate States Army, when he was called "'s Fighting Bishop". His official portrait at the University of the South depicts him as a bishop with his army uniform hanging nearby. He is often erroneously referred to as "Leonidas K. Polk" but he had no middle name and never signed any documents as such.
Polk was one of the war's more notable, yet controversial, political generals. Recognizing his familiarity with the Mississippi Valley, Confederate president Jefferson Davis commissioned his elevation to a high military position regardless of his lack of prior combat experience. He commanded troops in the Battle of Shiloh, the Battle of Perryville, the Battle of Stones River, the Tullahoma Campaign, the Battle of Chickamauga, the Meridian Campaign, and the Atlanta campaign. He is remembered for his bitter disagreements with his immediate superior, the likewise-controversial General Braxton Bragg of the Army of Tennessee, and for his limited success in combat. While serving under the command of General Joseph E. Johnston, he was killed in action in 1864 during the Atlanta campaign.
Polk briefly attended the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill before entering the United States Military Academy at West Point. During his senior year, he left the Scottish presbyterianism church. He joined the Episcopal Church and was baptized in the Academy Chapel by Chaplain Charles P. McIlvaine, who later became the Episcopal Bishop of Ohio. Polk had an impressive academic record, excelling in rhetoric and moral philosophy. He graduated eighth of 38 cadets on July 1, 1827, and was appointed a brevet second lieutenant in the artillery.Dupuy, p. 601.
Polk resigned his commission on December 1, 1827, to enter the Virginia Theological Seminary. He became an assistant to Bishop Richard Channing Moore at Monumental Church in Richmond, Virginia. Moore agreed to ordain Polk as a deacon in April 1830; however, on a visit to Raleigh in March, it was discovered that he had never been confirmed as an Episcopalian. To remedy the fact, before his ordination, he was hastily confirmed at St. John's Episcopal Church in Fayetteville, NC. He was then ordained a deacon as planned and a priest the following year. On May 6, 1830, Polk married Frances Ann Devereux, daughter of John Devereux and Frances Pollock; her mother was the granddaughter of Puritan theologian Jonathan Edwards. The Polks had eight children who survived to adulthood.Robins, p. 1538.
In 1832, Polk moved his family to the vast Polk Rattle and Snap tract in Maury County, Tennessee, and constructed a massive Greek Revival home called Ashwood Hall. Polk was the largest slaveowner in the county in 1840, owning 111 slaves. (By 1850, the census recorded that Polk owned 400 slaves, but other estimates are as high as 1000.) He built a family chapel with his four brothers in Maury County, St. John's Church, at Ashwood. He also served as priest of St. Peter's Church in Columbia, Tennessee. He was appointed Missionary Bishop of the Southwest in September 1838 and was elected first Bishop of Louisiana in October 1841. In 1848, he performed the marriage of his niece, Mary Bayard Devereux, to Major William John Clarke.
Polk was the leading founder of the in Sewanee, Tennessee, which he envisioned as a national university for the Southern United States and a New World equivalent to Oxford and Cambridge, both in England. (In his August 1856 letter to Bishop Elliott, he expounded on the secessionist motives for his university.) Polk laid and consecrated the cornerstone for the first building on October 9, 1860. Polk's foundational legacy at Sewanee is remembered through his portrait Sword Over the Gown, painted by Eliphalet F. Andrews in 1900. After the original was vandalized in 1998, a copy by Connie Erickson was unveiled on June 1, 2003. The title refers to the answer given by Polk "when asked in Richmond if he was putting off the gown of an Episcopal bishop to take up the sword of a Confederate general, to which he replied, 'No, Sir, I am buckling the sword over the gown,'" indicating that he saw it was his duty as a bishop to take up arms.
Some historians contend that Polk committed one of the great blunders of the Civil War by dispatching troops to occupy Columbus. Polk's action prompted the Kentucky legislature to request U.S. aid to "expel the invaders", ensuring U.S. control of Kentucky for the remainder of the war.Woodworth, Jefferson Davis, pp. 34–38; Noe, p. 8; Eicher, p. 432. Thomas L. Connelly wrote that "Polk had made what was probably one of the greatest mistakes of the war." Steven E. Woodworth stated that "it was one of the most decisive catastrophes the Confederacy ever suffered." Nathaniel C. Hughes maintained that it was "a political blunder of the first order." However, other historians believe that the pro-Unionism of the Kentucky legislature and the unwillingness of the people of Kentucky to get involved in the Civil War made Polk's action less disastrous. Robert I. Girardi noted that "plans were in place for a Federal seizure of Columbus on September 5, but it is unlikely that, had the town been taken, the public outcry would have been as loud or the political consequences as great. Kentucky was all but locked up for the Union by the time of Polk's invasion."
When A.S. Johnston replaced Polk as commander of the Western Department in September 1861, he expanded the Confederate invasion of Kentucky by seizing Bowling Green and Cumberland Gap. Johnston realized that Kentucky neutrality could not be restored and looked to secure a greater military advantage for the Confederacy. Polk heavily fortified Columbus and installed 140 pieces of artillery. On January 20, 1862, Union General Henry Halleck wrote that "Columbus cannot be taken without an immense siege-train and a terrible loss of life. I have thoroughly studied its defenses; they are very strong."Polk, Vol. II, p. 78 Polk's seizure of Columbus ensured that Federal navigation of the Mississippi River was blocked until the evacuation of the fortress in February 1862.
The Battle of Shiloh commenced in the early hours of Sunday, April 6, 1862. "Polk's corps, in columns of brigades, was massed behind Bragg's left. As Maj. Clark's division and Johnson's brigade of Brig. Cheatham's, aided Hardee in driving back Sherman and McClernand and hurled repeated attacks at the Hornet's Nest." Polk was in the midst of the fighting and exposed himself to the hottest of the enemy's fire. When the Federal position in the Hornet's Next finally collapsed, Polk accepted the surrender and received the sword of Union division commander, Brig. Gen. Benjamin M. Prentiss. At the end of the day, Cheatham's division returned to its bivouac of Saturday night to obtain rations and ammunition. Polk accompanied it but did not inform Beauregard, who had assumed command of the army after the death of A.S. Johnston that afternoon. Heavy Union reinforcements arrived during the night.
On April 7, 1862, a fierce Union counterattack struck the Confederate army. Beauregard reported: "Just about the time (10.30am) when General McCook was assuming the offensive with his whole division, and was near pushing through the gap between General Breckinridge's left and General Bragg's right, caused by the absence of General Polk with one of his divisions, the latter arrived on the field... Dashing forward with drawn sword, at the head of Cheatham's fine division, he soon formed his line of battle at the point where his presence was so much needed, and, with unsurpassed vigor, moved on against a force at least double his own, making one of the most brilliant charges of infantry made on either day of the battle. He drove back the opposing column in confusion, and thus compensated for the tardiness of his appearance on the field."Polk, Vol. II, p. 113 However, after another day of fighting, with no hope of reinforcement, Beauregard decided to withdraw the Army of Mississippi from the field and return to Corinth.
However, Polk disregarded the order from Bragg to attack the flank of the pursuing Union army near Frankfort. He only had 16,000 troops available and was justifiably concerned about the size of the Federal army in his frontMcWhiney, pp. 230, 300–08. "Buell's intentions had since become clearer; the Federal main effort was clearly aimed at Bardstown, not Frankfort... By the morning of October 3, the Federals stood about a day's march from Bardstown. Moving as ordered would cause the Confederates to collide with McCook's 13,000 strong I Corps near Bloomfield, east of Bardstown. Fighting McCook would delay the Confederate movement to Frankfort and would enable the rest of Buell's army to concentrate and smash Polk's force."
Failing to hear the sound of battle, Bragg galloped to Perryville on the morning of October 8, 1862, "overcome with anger at Polk for not following his order to attack 'immediately.' Bragg's irritation also extended to what he believed was a small Yankee force trifling with him, delaying his plan to fight a major battle to the north. Bragg 'refused to believe that Buell's entire army was present or approaching the field.' From the moment he arrived in Perryville Bragg assumed overall command, and 'overruling any objections from Polk and Hardee, Bragg ordered an immediate offensive.'"Warren, p. 102 The Battle of Perryville began again around Peters Hill as a Union division advanced up the pike, halting just before the Confederate line. After noon, a Confederate division struck the Union left flank, the I Corps of McCook, and forced it to fall back. One enduring legend of the Civil War is when Polk observed his subordinate, Maj. Gen. Cheatham, advancing his division, and Cheatham allegedly shouted, "Give 'em hell, boys!" Polk seconded the cheer while retaining the sensibility of a clergyman: "Give it to 'em, boys; give 'em what General Cheatham says!"McWhiney, pp. 314–16, McDonough, pp. 243–45.
When more Confederate divisions joined the fray, the Union line made a stubborn stand, counterattacked, but finally fell back with some units routed. Buell, several miles behind the action, was unaware that a major battle was taking place and did not send any reserves to the front until late in the afternoon. The Union troops on the left flank, reinforced by two brigades, stabilized their line, and the Confederate attack sputtered to a halt. Later, three Confederate regiments assaulted the Union division on the Springfield Pike but were repulsed and fell back into Perryville. Union troops pursued, and skirmishing occurred in the streets until dark. By that time, Union reinforcements were threatening the Confederate left flank. Bragg, short of men and supplies, withdrew during the night, and continued the Confederate retreat by way of Cumberland Gap into East Tennessee.
In the twilight of the day's battle, Polk was almost captured. He "rode through Liddell's soldiers to the next battle line and inquired, 'What troops are these?' The reply chilled him, 'The 22nd Indiana, Lt. Col. Squire Keith commanding.' Polk, the second highest-ranking Confederate on the battlefield, was now among Union troops. As Polk ordered him to cease firing, Keith asked, 'Who are you that gives this order?' General Polk again commanded him to cease firing or be court-martialed, which caused Keith to order his men to lower their weapons. The general rode along the 22nd's battle line, all the while feeling what he later described as 'a thousand centipedes... traveling up and down my backbone.' At the end, he spurred his horse back to Liddell's men and cried, 'General, every mother's son of them are Yankees! Open fire!'"Warren, p. 108
On the night of December 30, "Bragg held a council of war. He planned to attack the next day up the Nashville Pike; such an assault would likely have failed. Polk countered with a plan to 'turn the enemy's right where we outflanked him'; Bragg agreed. The Confederate left would attack in a grand right wheel, pushing the Federals northeast toward the Nashville Pike and railroad in... a jackknife movement." The next day, a massive assault by the corps of Hardee, followed by that of Polk, overran the Federal wing commanded by McCook. A stout defense by the division of Brig. Gen. Philip Sheridan in the right center of the line prevented a total collapse, and the Union assumed a tight defensive position backing up to the Nashville Turnpike. Repeated Confederate attacks were repulsed from this concentrated line, most notably in the cedar "Round Forest" salient. Bragg attempted to continue the assault with the division of Maj. Gen. John C. Breckinridge, but the troops were slow in arriving and their multiple piecemeal attacks failed. Fighting resumed on January 2, 1863, when Bragg ordered Breckinridge to assault a lightly defended Union position on a hill to the east of the Stones River. Chasing the retreating Union forces, they were led into a deadly trap. Faced with overwhelming artillery, the Confederates were repulsed with heavy losses. Fearing the arrival of Union reinforcements, Bragg chose to withdraw his army on January 3 to Tullahoma, Tennessee. Once again, Bragg's subordinates politicked to remove their army commander after an unsuccessful battle (the battle was tactically inconclusive, but Bragg was unable to stop the advance of the Army of the Cumberland).
Despite his major contribution to the tactical planning of the Battle of Stones River, Polk performed rather poorly when executing it. He made a "spur-of-the-moment decision while his corps, positioned for battle, waited in line to advance... As things stood, Withers' division occupied the front with Cheatham lined up behind. Just before they went in, Polk decreed that Cheatham would command the two left brigades, front and rear, while Withers would control the corresponding brigades on the right. This order instantly placed half of his command under unfamiliar leadership without sufficient time to adjust."Warren, p. 122 In addition, when directing the advance of his corps against the Federal positions during the battle of Stones River, Polk committed the error of employing piece-meal assaults, diluting the effectiveness of his offensive and adding to the slaughter of the attackers.
Bragg was determined to reoccupy Chattanooga and decided to meet a part of Rosecrans's army, defeat it, and then move back into the city. On September 17 he headed north, intending to attack Crittenden's corps. As Bragg marched north on September 18, his cavalry and infantry fought with Union cavalry and mounted infantry, which were armed with Spencer repeating rifles. The two armies fought at Alexander's Bridge and Reed's Bridge, as the Confederates tried to cross the West Chickamauga Creek. The Battle of Chickamauga began in earnest on the morning of September 19. Bragg's men strongly assaulted but could not break the Union line. "During the evening of September 19, 1863, after the first full day of battle at Chickamauga, General Bragg made plans and issued orders for the following morning, involving a wholesale reorganization of the Confederate high command due to the arrival of General Longstreet that night at 11:00. Polk was to oversee the right wing with D.H. Hill, who would no longer independently command his own corps, but function instead as second-in-command under Polk. Longstreet was assigned the left wing. The battle plan consisted of an attack to open at daylight beginning on the Confederate right and moving en echelon toward the left. Longstreet was to hold his forces in position awaiting the sound of Polk's guns on the right."Warren, pp. 219–220
However, the attack of Polk's right wing was delayed by about four hours. "Bragg provided only oral orders to Polk. Then, due to circuitous travels through the dark, foggy, forested wilderness during the night, neither Bragg's nor Polk's couriers were able to locate D.H. Hill, who in turn got lost seeking Polk's headquarters."Warren, p. 220 The courier sent with written orders was not able to find Hill and returned to his unit without informing anyone. Gen. Breckinridge, one of Hill's division commanders, was at Polk's headquarters, but was not informed that his division was to initiate the dawn attack. At 5 a.m. on September 20, Polk was awakened on the cold and foggy battlefield to find that Hill was not preparing to attack. He prepared new written orders, which reached Hill about 6 a.m. Hill responded with a number of reasons for delaying the attack, including readjustments of the alignment of his units, reconnaissance of the enemy line, and issuing breakfast rations to his men. The delay allowed the Union defenders time to complete their field fortifications and repulse the Confederate offensive on the right. An enraged Bragg blamed Polk for the mix-up and wrote after the war that if it were not for the loss of these hours, "our independence might have been won."Woodworth, Six Armies, pp. 103, 106; Hallock, pp. 54–62, 71–74.
In late morning, Rosecrans was misinformed that he had a gap in his line. In moving units to shore up the supposed gap, Rosecrans accidentally created an actual gap directly in the path of an eight-brigade assault on a narrow front by Longstreet. In the resulting rout, Longstreet's attack drove one-third of the Army of the Cumberland, including Rosecrans himself, from the field. Chickamauga was a great tactical victory for Bragg. Still, instead of pursuing and destroying the U.S. army as it retreated, he laid siege to it in Chattanooga, concentrating his effort against the enemies inside his army instead of his enemies from the North. Bragg demanded an explanation from Polk on his failure to attack in time on September 20, and Polk placed much of the blame on Hill. Bragg wrote to President Davis, "Gen'l Polk by education and habit is unfit for executing the plans of others. He will convince himself his own are better and follow them without reflecting on the consequences." Bragg relieved Polk of his command and ordered him to Atlanta to await further orders. Although Polk protested the "arbitrary and unlawful order" to the Secretary of War and demanded a court of inquiry, he was not restored to his position. Davis once again retained Bragg in army command, despite the protestations of several of his subordinate generals.Hallock, pp. 89–92; Woodworth, Jefferson Davis, pp. 239–40; Connelly, pp. 247–48.
Polk only had about 9,000 troops, and greatly outnumbered, he "decided not to give battle to Sherman's infantry. He ordered his cavalry, under Maj. Gen. Stephen D. Lee northward to cooperate with Maj. Gen. Nathan B. Forrest against Sooy Smith's advancing cavalry; he had hopes of destroying that arm of the Federal force. To his, however, he gave 'discretionary orders' to fall back whenever expedient... Polk's infantry and trains moved out of Meridian on February 14... This was a well-timed and well-directed withdrawal. All stores at Meridian and all at Enterprise 'except corn in the shuck' were saved. All shop tools and rolling stock 'except eight or ten cars' were likewise moved to safety... Sherman moved into Meridian the day Polk moved out." While Sherman and his army were waiting for Sooy Smith, he ordered his troops "to wipe the appointed meeting place off the map" by destroying the railroads and burning much of the area to the ground. Sherman is reported to have said, "Meridian with its depots, store-houses, arsenal, hospitals, offices, hotels, and cantonments no longer exists." Polk urged Forrest and Lee to defeat Sooy Smith, stating that if this could be achieved, Sherman's whole army "must come to a bad end." He later recorded that "if Sherman was deprived of Sooy presence and services to procure forage and subsistence for his army it must starve and destruction by starvation was as effectual as destruction by battle."Parks, pp. 361–362
Sooy Smith's force retreated after running into Forrest and was then defeated at the Battle of Okolona on February 22, 1864. Having not heard from Sooy Smith, Sherman withdrew from Meridian and returned to Vicksburg. Polk reported to President Davis that "the vigorous action of my cavalry under General Lee kept Sherman so closed up that he could not spread out and forage. As an evidence of this, a drove of hogs of mine was on the way east and pursued a route within 6 miles on an average of his line of march without molestation and have arrived safely. He was deprived entirely of the rolling stock of all the roads between the Pearl and Tombigbee River Rivers, as well as of the use of all the valuable stores which had been accumulated at depots on those roads... I have already taken measures to have all the roads broken up by him rebuilt, and shall press that work vigorously. The amount of road destroyed by him may be in all about 50 miles, extending out on the four roads from Meridian as a center."Official Records, Volume XXXII, Chapter XLIV, p. 338-339 Polk's work crews repaired the damage to the railroad by March 24, 1864. The Memphis Daily Appeal wrote: "We think the repairing of the Mobile and Ohio road will compare with Yankee Enterprise." Historian Jeffrey N. Lash wrote that "Leonidas Polk was easily the Confederacy's ablest railroad general" for his efforts in the Meridian Campaign.
By using successive flanking maneuvers, Sherman forced Johnston to withdraw his army from strong defensive positions to protect the Confederate line of communication. This forced Johnston ever closer to the critically important city of Atlanta.McMurray, p. 62; Woodworth, Jefferson Davis, p. 281. After heavy fighting near Resaca, Polk received a letter from Johnston's wife: "You are never too much occupied I well know to pause to perform a good deed and will I am sure, even whilst leading your soldiers on to victory, lead my soldier nearer to God. General Johnston has never been baptized and it is the dearest wish of my heart that he should be and that you should perform the ceremony would be a great satisfaction to me... I rejoice that you are near him in these trying times. May God crown all your efforts with success and spare your life for your country and friends." On May 18, Johnston was baptized by Polk in the presence of Hood and Hardee.Parks, pp. 377–378
On June 14, 1864, Polk was scouting enemy positions near Marietta, Georgia, with his staff when he was killed in action by a U.S. shell at Pine Mountain.Welsh, p. 174. The artillery fire was initiated when Sherman spotted a cluster of Confederate generals — Polk, Hardee, and Johnston, with their staffs — in an exposed area. He pointed them out to Maj. Gen. Oliver Otis Howard, commander of the U.S. IV Corps, and ordered him to fire upon them. Battery I of the 1st Ohio Light Artillery, commanded by Capt. Hubert Dilger, obeyed the order within minutes. The first round from the battery came close and a second came even closer, causing the men to disperse. The third shell struck Polk's left arm, went through his chest, and exited, hitting his right arm, then exploded against a tree; it nearly cut Polk in two.Smith, pp. 253–54. Foote, p. 356, credits Battery I, 1st Ohio Light Battery, commanded by Capt. Hubert Dilger. Polk's biographer, Joseph Parks, describes his death (pp. 382–83) without identifying the U.S. artillery responsible. Three little blood-stained books were found in Polk's pocket. Titled Balm for the Weary and Wounded, each had been inscribed to Generals Johnston, Hardee, and Hood, respectively, "with the compliments of Lieutenant General Leonidas Polk, June 12, 1864."
Polk's nephew, Lucius E. Polk, was also a Confederate general. Lucius E. Polk's son Rufus King Polk was a Congressman. Leonidas Polk's son, William Mecklenburg Polk, was a physician and a Confederate captain who later served as a First Lieutenant in the U.S. Army during World War I.Polk IV, Francis Devereux. "Confederate officer becomes officer in WWI". Confederate Veteran. March/April 2017. Page 53 He later authored his most flattering biography. William M. Polk's son, Frank Polk, served as a counselor to the U.S. Department of State through World War I and later became the first Under Secretary of State. Polk's portrait, done by Cornelius Hankins, was donated to Christ Church Cathedral in Nashville, Tennessee, by his grandson W. Dudley Gate, in 1963.
Military historian Steven E. Woodworth described the shell that killed Polk as "one of the worst shots fired for the Union cause during the entire course of the war", as Polk's incompetence made him far more valuable alive than dead: "Polk's incompetence and willful disobedience had consistently hamstrung Confederate operations west of the Appalachians, while his special relationship with the president made the bishop-general untouchable." Conversely, historian Joseph H. Parks wrote that "Polk was a competent corps commander, yet his frequent disagreements with Bragg would seem to indicate that he was at times hesitant in executing the orders of his superior. This charge, however, becomes less serious in view of the fact that all high ranking officers within the Army of Tennessee, distrusting Bragg's competence as a field commander, supported Polk in his apparent disregard of orders. Left unanswered was the question of whether or not the orders of a superior should be executed regardless of conditions or circumstances. Through it all, Polk's forgiving spirit was put to a severe test as he came to believe Bragg wished to saddle him with the responsibility for failure of the Army of Tennessee to win the victories expected of it."Parks, pp. 384–385
American Civil War
Western Department
Missouri Campaign
Invasion of Kentucky
Battle of Belmont
Evacuation of Columbus
Battle of Shiloh
Battle of Perryville
Army of Tennessee
Battle of Stones River
Tullahoma Campaign
Battle of Chickamauga
Meridian Campaign
Atlanta Campaign and death
Legacy
See also
Notes
External links
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